Judicial Review of Agency Action:  The Unsettled Law of Standing by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 69 Issue 3 
1971 
Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REV. 
540 (1971). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/4 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMMENTS 
Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law 
of Standing 
Traditionally, the doctrine of standing has existed as the major 
obstacle frustrating the attempts of numerous plaintiffs to obtain 
relief for the injuries they have suffered as a result of allegedly 
illegal action by federal administrative agencies.1 Frequently, the 
rigid standards effectively have prevented any feasible plaintiff from 
challenging the actions of an administrative agency. The ultimate 
consequence of this problem has been practically to insulate a wide 
range of administrative activity from judicial review.2 
In recent years the courts have been under increasing pressure 
to liberalize the law of standing and to provide a judicial forum 
where administrative agencies would be required to justify their 
conduct. In response to this pressure, the Supreme Court, in a series 
of cases over the past few years, has undertaken a major overhaul of 
all aspects of the law of standing. In light of this judicial activity, a 
re-examination of the current law of standing appears to be in order. 
I. THE LAW OF STANDING PRIOR TO 1970 
The test for standing is focused on the constitutional require-
ment that the judicial power of the United States be limited to 
"cases" and "controversies."3 In a few situations the Supreme Court 
1. The scope of this Comment will be limited to judicial review of federal agencies. 
Moreover, it will not discuss, except peripherally, the right of parties to intervene in 
federal agency hearings. For a treatment of the right to intervene in agency hearing11, 
see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.08 (1958). 
2. One area in which judicial review has been restricted on standing grounds 
involves actions to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's rulings allowing 
national banks to expand their activities into nonbanking operations. See note 16 
infra. Also subjected to the same obstacle have been actions by residents of urban-
renewal areas to require federal administrators to comply with statutory standards for 
federal housing programs. See Comment, Judicial Review in Urban Renewal Cases: 
Concepts and Consequences, 57 GEO. L.J. 615 (1969); Note, Protecting the Standing 
of Renewal Site Families To Seek Review of Community Relocation Planning, 73 
YALE L.J. 1080 (1964). Other areas in which standing has inhibited judicial review in-
clude conservation of historic landmarks (e.g., South Hill Neighborhood Assn. v. Rom-
ney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); Kent County Coundl 
for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969)) and the alloca-
tion of electrical-power and utilities markets (Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 
U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Rural Elec. Admin. v. 
Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); 
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 884 (1955)). 
3. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. One of the justifications for the existence of standing is 
that it prevents suits that are collusive or friendly or that seek advisory opinions 
and that it therefore avoids the resolution of issues that are not fully and openly 
argued. 
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has stated that this constitutional minimum represents all that is 
required to determine standing-that is, when a party shows such a 
personal stake in the controversy to assure a "concrete adverseness" 
in which issues will be litigated, then standing will attach.4' This 
minimum approach, however, generally has not been adopted by the 
courts for purposes of review of agency action. Rather the courts 
have usually required the plaintiff to show something more before 
he is granted standing to challenge agency action. The nature of this 
additional requirement varies with the situation; generally, however, 
the plaintiff has been required to demonstrate the applicability to 
his claim of one of four means of attaining standing: (1) a legal 
right created by common law; or (2) an express provision within a 
statute for judicial review; or (3) section IO(a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (AP A)/' commonly referred to as the "standing" 
provision; or ( 4) in the absence of a statutory provision for express 
review, proof of an implied congressional grant of review based on 
a legislative purpose to protect the plaintiff's interest. 
A. Tennessee Power: The Legal-Wrong Test 
For thirty years the leading case in the law of standing was 
Tennessee Electric Power Company v. TV A.6 In that case, the 
Supreme Court gave the "legal wrong test"7-which became the 
central standard for determining questions of standing-its most 
prominent and influential application. In Tennessee Power, nineteen 
power companies sought to challenge the constitutional validity of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A). Despite the uncontroverted 
fact of financial damage to the plaintiffs, the court found that they 
had no right derived from common law, statute, or franchise to be 
free from competition: 
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with di-
4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Flast involved a challenge by a taxpayer to 
a federal program that financially aided parochial schools. In addition to requiring 
the plaintiff to prove injury in fact, the Court in Flast required the plaintiff to prove 
that a "logical nexus" existed between his status as a taxpayer and a specific con-
stitutional limitation on the congressional taxing and spending power in the Con-
stitution. 392 U.S. at 102-03. Thus it is not clear whether injury in fact is the "consti-
tutional" minimum or whether a nexus appropriate to the particular type of action is 
required. For analyses of Flast, see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 601 (1968), and The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 224-31 (1968). 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964), 
6. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113 (1940), and 
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) for applications of the legal-wrong 
test. 
7. The legal-wrong test was most prominently expounded in Tennessee Power, 
in which the Court stated that to challenge a statute, a plaintiff must show that there 
has been a "violation of his legal rights" and that the "right invaded is a legal 
right." 306 U.S. at 137. Thus the plaintiff must establish that a "legal wrong" was 
inflicted upon him. 
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rect and special injury by the act of an agent of the government which, 
but for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation 
of his legal rights, may challenge the validity of the statute in a suit 
against the agent. The principle is without application unless the 
right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of 
contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on 
a statute which confers a privilege.8 
The plaintiffs in Tennessee Power argued that when Congress 
established a federally :financed hydroelectric system it had violated 
their rights to engage in and carry on the business of supplying 
electrical power free of governmentally sponsored competition. The 
plaintiffs contended that they must be granted standing to bring 
their suit in order to protect this legal right.9 The Supreme Court 
rejected the power companies' position and held that they failed to 
meet the legal-·wrong test, and that such a test must be met in order 
to be allowed standing to contest governmental action.10 The Court 
held that the plaintiffs did not possess any substantive right to be 
free of governmentally sponsored competition.11 Failure to enjoy 
such a legal right meant, conversely, that when the Government 
established the TV A these companies had suffered no legally cogniz-
able "wrong." Rather, as noted above,12 the Supreme Court required 
an immediate inquiry into the nature of the claim asserted by the 
plaintiff. In large measure, this inquiry was one conducted on the 
merits, for the Court only looked to see whether some common-law 
property right had been violated.13 If such a right had not in fact 
been violated, then the Court was not willing to say that a legally 
recognized wrong had occurred for purposes of standing. The 
Supreme Court decided Tennessee Power at a time when the federal 
bureaucracy was on the threshold of an enormous expansion. Un-
fortunately, in formulating the rigid legal-wrong test in that case, 
the Court did not recognize the necessity of providing significant 
judicial checks on the conduct of the mushrooming bureaucracy.H 
8. 306 U.S. at 137-38. 
9. 306 U.S. at 124-25. Cf. Frost v. Corporation Commn., 278 U.S. 515 (1929) (plain-
tiffs had standing to challenge the grant of a license to a competitor based on a 
government franchise). 
10. 306 U.S. at 137-38. 
11. 306 U.S. at 139. 
12. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
13. 306 U.S. at 137-39. 
14. See Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
923 (1970) (challenge by attorney to competition arising from government-sponsored 
legal-aid programs); South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 285 F. Supp. 
676 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd., 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969) (challenge by bus line to federally 
financed municipal transit system). See also the cases discussed in note 16 infra, in 
which various bank competitors challenged the rulings of the Comptroller of the 
Currency; Rasmussen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970) (challenge by state 
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Over the years, the defects of the Tennessee Power doctrine have 
become evident. The plight of the plaintiff who desires to challenge 
allegedly illegal agency action has been perceptively described by 
Professor Davis: 
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always has 
standing if a legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right 
of the plaintiff is not at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has standing 
and sometimes lacks standing. Circular reasoning is very common, for 
one of the questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff 
has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but the 
question whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, 
for if the plaintiff has standing his interest is a legally-protected 
interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right.115 
In other words, the legal-wrong test has required that the determina-
tion whether standing exists be based not on the personal stake of 
the party, but on a circular, conclusory process by which the merits 
are resolved in order to justify a decision of standing. Very simply, 
the fundamental objection to the test is that it goes to the merits. 
Again, Professor Davis has summarized this objection to the legal-
wrong test: "What happens repeatedly is, in effect, that injury to the 
plaintiff plus illegality of the governmental action equals standing; 
the essence of many opinions is that injury plus illegality equals a 
legal right."16 Certainly if a plaintiff fails to establish the violation 
public-service commission to discontinuance of railroad operations by Post Office 
Dept.); Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965) (challenge by growers and non-
resident Mexican nationals to immigration eligibility): Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 
570 (8th Cir. 1962) (challenge by farmers to relocation of Dept. of Agriculture office). 
15. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 22.04, at 217. 
16. Davis, supra note 4, at 621. Professor Davis' analysis is demonstrated in cases in 
which competitors of banks that had been authorized by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency to engage in nonbank activities challenged the Comptroller's rulings. In Baker, 
Watts &: Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. sub nom. Port of N.Y. 
Authority v. Baker, Watts &: Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968), an investment-banking 
firm challenged a Comptroller's ruling that allowed banks to underwrite and deal in 
general obligations of states and their political subdivisions that were not supported 
by the taxing power. The district court attempted to distinguish the case from the line 
of cases following Tennessee Power. But in the process it still focused on the merits in 
deciding the standing issue: 
While no one may maintain a suit to restrain lawful competition merely because 
he is suffering an economic detriment, nevertheless, a person has a standing to 
complain against illegal competition, or specifically, against competition on the part 
of a person who lacks the legal right or power to pursue the competitive activities. 
261 F. Supp. at 248. Significantly, the court later decided that the Comptroller had 
no authority under applicable federal statutes to allow banks to engage in such activi-
ties. But only after this determination was the standing issue resolved. Instead of 
analyzing the personal stake of the plaintiff or any congressional intent to provide 
reviewability by him, the court relied on the substantive outcome to determine the 
preliminary issue of standing. 
This analytical fallacy was also displayed in Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent 
Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the court held that the plaintiff 
insurance agents had standing to contest a Comptroller's ruling that banks could act as 
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of a legal right, a dismissal for failure to state a claim or cause of 
action, rather than a dismissal for want of standing, would be the 
appropriate judicial response. 
B. Sanders: Provision for Express Review 
The Court soon recognized the rigidity of the legal-wrong test, 
and within two years after Tennessee Power it moved to establish 
the first exception-albeit a very limited one-to that test. In FCC 
v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,17 the plaintiff, an owner of a radio 
station, sought judicial review of the grant of an operating license to 
an applicant. The plaintiff claimed only that it had suffered eco-
nomic harm from the competition. The Federal Communications 
Act allowed an appeal by any "person aggrieved or whose interests 
are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or 
refusing any such application."18 On the basis of this provision, the 
Court held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the grant of 
the license to its competitor. 
Rather than applying the rigid test of Tennessee Power in this 
statutory context, the Court looked to the congressional purposes 
in passing the Federal Communications Act and to the policies 
evident in that Act. Although the competitor could not demonstrate 
that it had been subjected to a legal wrong, the Court found that 
the plaintiff did have sufficient interest as a competitor to justify 
conferring standing in the proceedings.19 The Court construed the 
review provision of the Federal Communications Act broadly as an 
express grant of standing to the plaintiff-competitor.20 The Court 
insurance agencies incident to banking transactions. Such activities were statutorily 
limited to places that had populations that did not exceed 5000 people. Nevertheless, 
the Comptroller attempted to justify his ruling on his general rule-making authority. 
Although presented with a rather straightforward case on the merits, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit devoted most of its opinion to justifying its holding that 
the plaintiff had standing. The court distinguished the case before it from Tennessee 
Power because in the instant case, the government-sponsored competition was "un-
lawful," whereas in Tennessee Power, it was "lawful." 899 F.2d at 1016. The result in 
Saxon was doubtless an appropriate one from a policy viewpoint. Nevertheless, it was 
unfortunate that the court was driven to such a strained analysis in order to reach 
its desired result. This type of analysis employed by the court has been criticized by 
Judge Burger, in his concurring opinion in National Assn. of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 420 
F.2d 83, 107 (D;C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. granted, 897 U.S. 986 (1970) (No. 885, 
1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term): 
Quite often courts pursued a "bootstrap" or circular logic by initially analyzing 
the merits, in order that a finding of standing to challenge actions seems more 
palatable because the court has already found a possible encroachment of "rights" 
which it desires to review. To evaluate standing solely or even primarily on such 
visceral reactions does violence to the judicially created concepts of standing •••• 
See pt. V infra for a discussion of the case. 
17. ll09 U.S. 470 (1940). 
18. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964), quoted at ll09 U.S. at 476-77. 
19. ll09 U.S. at 476-77. 
20. ll09 U.S. at 476-77. 
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justified this broad interpretation of the provmon on the policy 
ground that competitors were "the only person having a sufficient 
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of 
law."21 Thus, instead of applying a formal legal-wrong test, the 
Court looked to the relevant legislative history and formulated a 
new test that required a plaintiff to demonstrate only an actual 
private injury in order to assert the public interest in the limited 
situations-such as was presented in Sanders-in which an express 
statutory provision for review existed. To this extent, Sanders, and 
the test formulated in that case, has been applied to a separate seg-
ment of the law of standing and has coexisted with Tennessee Power 
and the test of that case over the years.22 
C. The Administrative Procedure Act 
In 1946 Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act,23 
which provided that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning 
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."24 The 
AP A was designed to limit the unchecked power of federal adminis-
trative agencies by providing a minimum standard of review in the 
absence of an express review provision in the relevant statute.25 
Thus, if a regulatory statute did contain an express review provision, 
that provision would be applied by a court, as was done by the Court 
in Sanders.26 In the absence of such a provision, the APA would 
apply. The lower courts have consistently held that the AP A merely 
codified existing law-the Tennessee Power legal-wrong theory.27 
21. !109 U.S. at 477. Professor Jaffe has argued that Congress was not interested or 
concerned about encouraging private individuals to protect the public interest, and he 
found no basis in the legislative history for the Court's discovery of such an intent. 
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 522 (1965). 
22. The progeny of Sanders has further liberalized review under the Federal 
Communications Act, extending standing to challenge license renewals to a manu-
facturer of consumer electronic products, Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 
1958), and listening groups, Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ 
v. FCC, !159 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Standing To Protest and 
,-1ppeal the Issuance of Broadcasting Licenses: A Constricted Concept Redefined, 68 
YALE L.J. 78!1 (1959); Recent Development, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 518 (1967). 
2!1. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. !124, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 2!17-44, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-11 (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) [herein-
after APA]. 
24. APA § IO(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) 
(1964). 
25. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess, !I0-31 (1945). 
26. 309 U.S. at 477. 
27. The leading case is Kansas City Power 8c Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). However, the same court has rec• 
ognized that the weight of McKay "has been greatly reduced" and has therefore adopted 
the position of Professor Davis (see note 28 infra and accompanying text) that the AP A 
greatly expanded standing. Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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Professor Davis, on the other hand, has argued that the AP A signifi-
cantly expanded the availability of standing in that it requires only 
that a party prove that he was adversely affected in fact;28 but his 
view has not received much support in the courts.29 
D. Hardin: Implied Review 
The law of standing to challenge agency action remained fairly 
static until 1968, when the Supreme Court decided Hardin v. 
Kentucky Utilities Company.30 In Hardin, a private power company 
sought review of the expansion of TV A services into its market area 
by alleging the violation of a statute that prohibited TV A expansion 
after a stated date.31 It has long been settled that possession of an 
express government-granted franchise or license entitles the bearer 
to standing to challenge the granting of any additional government-
issued franchises.32 In Hardin, however, the power company could 
not claim that an express government franchise furnished it pro-
tection from competition; instead it had to rely on only the implica-
tion of such protection from a regulatory statute. In the absence of 
an express provision for judicial review in the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Act, the Supreme Court undertook an examination of the 
pertinent legislative history. From this inquiry it drew the inference 
A number of cases in other jurisdictions have followed McKay: Braude v. Wirtz, 350 
F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965); Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962); Harrison-
Halsted Community Group v. Housing &: Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 
1962). 
28. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 22.02, at 211-13. Professor Davis' argument, however, 
turns on limited support in the legislative history of the AP A and on the interpretation 
that the phrase "within the meaning of a relevant statute" modifies only "aggrieved" 
and not "affected" (see text accompanying note 24 supra). However, other commentators 
have disagreed. See, e.g., Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judidal Review: Private Actions, 75 
HARV. L, R.Ev. 255, 287-88 (1961), and Note, Competitors' Standing To Challenge Ad-
ministrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 843 (1956) (both asserting that 
the APA only codified the existing law of standing). Professor Davis has also argued that 
the phrasing of the AP A is so similar to numerous regulatory statutes-for example, the 
statute at issue in Sanders (see text accompanying note 18 supra)-as to indicate that 
Congress intended to incorporate the approach of Sanders into the AP A. Thus, a plain-
tiff could obtain standing merely by establishing injury in fact. Davis, supra note 4, at 
618-19. 
29. The position of Professor Davis was expressly rejected in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. 
Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1151 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 315, 
affd. on remand, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), revd. and remanded, 39 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. 
Nov. 24, 1970) (per curiam) (see notes 84 &: 92 infra). Other courts have impliedly re-
jected the position of Professor Davis in holding that the APA only codified existing 
law. See note 27 supra. 
30. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the Hardin line of cases, see Comment, 
The Congressional Intent To Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing 
Barrier, 41 u. COLO. L. R.Ev. 96 (1969). 
31. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 § 15d(a), 16 U.S.C. § 83ln-4(a) (1964), 
quoted at 390 U.S. at 3 n.l. 
32. Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka &: Santa Fe R.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Alton R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), Cf. Frost v. Corporation Commn., 278 U.S. 515 
(1929). 
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that the "primary purpose" of the statute was to benefit the plaintiff's 
interests.33 The Court held that a finding of an implicit congressional 
intent to benefit the plaintiff was a sufficient justification to grant 
him standing.34 
The Hardin test represented a major breakthrough in the law of 
standing. For the first time in over thirty years, the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff could seek review absent either a legal injury 
or express congressional permission. The usefulness of the Hardin 
test has been limited, however, by the difficulty inherent in conduct-
ing the required probe into legislative history in order to ascertain 
·what the congressional intent was in enacting a particular statute. 
II. THE FUNCI10N OF STANDING: LIBERALIZED OR 
LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A strict reading of Tennessee Power and the cases that followed 
it would limit greatly the opportunities for plaintiffs to challenge 
decisions of federal administrative agencies. Yet public policy clearly 
requires that these agencies be subject to some sort of effective 
judicial review. Without such review the exercise of the vast power 
vested by Congress in these agencies would be subject to no effective 
check at all. It is clear that in order to facilitate effective, indepen-
dent review of administrative decision-making, the test of standing 
must not obstruct the goal of providing a forum in which the legal 
issues concerning the public interest may be litigated most appropri-
ately. However, courts frequently express doubt about their compe-
tency to deal with the detailed and complex issues that arise when 
questions concerning the administration of government programs 
are presented.35 Critics of expanded judicial review might fear that 
such review, rather than furthering public goals, would actually 
serve to impede the administrative efficiency of these programs.36 
The critics might also express concern that the enhanced prominence 
of the judiciary in administrative decision-making would be contrary 
to the principle of separation of powers in the national government. 
Moreover, they might argue that increased judicial involvement 
311. 390 U.S. at 6-7. 
M. 390 U.S. at 7. 
35. Cf. Rural Elec. Admin. v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686, 700 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Community Natl. Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 
514, 518-19 (E.D. Mich. 1961), affd. as modified, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962). See gen-
erally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency 
Discretion", 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968). For a thoughtful appraisal of the risks and 
limits of judicial review, see Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's 
Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 201 (1970). 
36. The critia of expanded review might contend that administrators would be 
inhibited from firm decision-making by a desire to avoid review and remand of a 
controversy, by the delays caused by trials and appeals, and by the conflicting deci-
sions of courts of various jurisdictions. 
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could create an image of a judiciary that is attempting to usurp the 
role of an elected executive branch in making public-policy decisions 
or interpreting congressionally dictated policies.37 In the most ex-
treme circumstances, particularly unpopular judicial decisions might 
precipitate judicial confrontations with the executive branch in 
enforcing decisions against recalcitrant agencies or their adminis-
trators. Finally, the critics might argue that an already oppressive 
federal-court caseload would be substantially aggravated by liberal-
ized judicial review. 38 
However valid these objections to liberalized judicial review 
may be, it is submitted that the doctrine of standing is an inappro-
priate doctrine to implement a policy of more limited judicial 
review. Concededly, certain issues may be, by their nature, outside 
the limits of judicial power or not readily susceptible to judicial 
review.39 However, a number of doctrines other than standing are 
available to courts that desire not to decide such issues. Included 
among these doctrines are ripeness,40 exhaustion of remedies,41 
deference to agency discretion,42 and the political question.43 Never-
theless, it would appear that courts have used the standing doctrine 
to restrict judicial review of agency action, and that as a result, the 
doctrine has served a number of unexpressed purposes. Professor 
Davis has remarked that the retention of the legal-wrong test for so 
many years was probably 
37. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of 
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (1966) (additional statement of 
Dean Envin N. Griswold): 
The vice in the proposal to have "taxpayers' suits," it seems to me, lies in the idea 
that ultimate power in our country should reside with the courts .••• The sorts 
of questions which arise with respect to the spending power are, in my view, 
better adopted for consideration and decision by the executive and legislative 
branches of the Government than by the judiciary. 
38. Professor Davis, however, argues to the contrary that the experience of state 
courts that liberally allow standing does not support this fear, Davis, The Liberalized 
Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1967), and federal courts are increas-
ingly rejecting this "floodgates" argument. See, e.g., Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 
859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 
617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also the statement by Judge Burger in 
Office of Communications v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "The fears of 
regulatory agencies that their processes will be inundated by expansion of standing 
criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the expense of participation 
in the administrative process •••• " The court also noted that the Commission could use 
its inherent powers and rule-making authority to ease the impact of any increase in its 
caseload caused by increased intervention. It would seem that the same analysis could be 
applied to standing for judicial review. 
39. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171 n.3 (1970) austice Brennan, con-
curring in the result and dissenting). 
40. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 21.01. 
41. Id. § 20.02. 
42. 4 id. § 28.01. 
43. Id. 
January 1971] Comments 549 
motivated by various ideas not appearing on the face of formal 
opinions such as the notion that the law of standing can keep judges 
from assuming too much governmental power, that it can limit 
courts to appropriate subject matter, that it can help assure com-
petent presentation of cases, and, above all, that it can protect 
against a flood of litigation that might so much overburden the 
courts as to produce a disastrous deterioration in the quality of all 
that courts do.44 
III. DATA PROCESSING AND BARLOW 
A. The Cases and the New Test 
In 1970, the Supreme Court attempted to restore some order to 
the confused law of standing in the companion cases of Association 
of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp45 and Bar-
low v. Collins.46 In Data Processing the Comptroller of the 
Currency issued an interpretive ruling, pursuant to the National 
Banking Act,47 authorizing national banks to provide data-processing 
services to their customers.48 The Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, whose members provide computer services 
throughout the United States, and Data Systems, Inc., a servicing 
corporation, filed suit contesting the validity of the Comptroller's 
ruling. The plaintiffs claimed that the ruling violated a provision of 
the National Banking Act that gives national banks only such 
"incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking,''49 and that as a result of this ruling, the data-processing 
industry would be faced with increased competition from which it 
would incur substantial financial harm.50 The district court51 and 
the court of appeals52 both held that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing to challenge the Comptroller's ruling. Both lower courts 
felt that the plaintiffs did not possess a private legal interest, had 
44. Davis, supra note 38, at 469. 
45. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). This case and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), are 
discussed in Davis, supra note 38; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 
177 (1970); Comment, Competitors' Standing To Challenge Administrative Action-
Recent Federal Developments, 48 N.C. L. REv. 807, 826-30 (1970); Note, Standing To 
Challenge Federal Administrative Action in the Wake of Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations v. Camp, I LoYoLA (CHICAGO) L.J. 285 (1970); Recent Case, 23 
VAND. L. REv. 814 (1970). 
46. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
48. 397 U.S. at 151. 
49. 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (1964). 
50. 397 U.S. at 152. 
51. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 
{D, Minn. 1968). 
52. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th 
Cir. 1969). 
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not pleaded any legal harm recognized at law, and had not proved 
that their status was one that placed them in a class protected by a 
statute.53 
In Barlow, the Secretary of Agriculture amended regulations 
issued pursuant to section 402(a) of the Food and Agriculture Act of 
1965.54 The amendments resulted in an alteration of the balance of 
economic power between tenant farmers and their landlords. The 
regulations previously had provided that a farmer could assign his 
government benefit payments "only as security for cash or advances 
to finance making a crop ... .''55 The amended regulation redefined the 
phrase "making a crop" to include the rent these tenants paid, 
thereby permitting, for the first time, assignment of the benefit 
payments to the landlords.56 Clemon Barlow and other tenant farmers 
filed a suit against the Secretary in which they claimed that after the 
amendment was issued they were required by their landlords to 
execute a rent note as security for the cash rent, and thus were 
deprived of their prior bargaining power with area merchants and 
suppliers. The plaintiffs further claimed that such a result was 
contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the Food and Agricul-
ture Act. 57 In affirming the opinion of the district court that the 
tenant farmers lacked standing to challenge the regulations, 58 the 
court of appeals held that they lacked such standing because they 
had failed to show a legally protected property right to be free from 
the effect of the amendment and had failed to show any express or 
implied legislative grant of standing to them. 59 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Data Processing60 and va-
cated and remanded Barlow.61 The Court firmly rejected the legal-
wrong test that Tennessee Power had endorsed.62 By so doing, it may 
be inferred that the Court believed that considerations of public 
policy clearly required that the test for standing be substantially 
liberalized. The Court recognized that in the course of the thirty 
years since Tennessee Power, the trend in the law of standing had 
been "toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest 
administrative action."63 The Court noted: "There is no presumption 
53. 406 F.2d at 842-43; 279 F. Supp. at 678. 
54. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), discussed at 397 U.S. at 160 n.l. 
55. 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955), quoted at 397 U.S. at 161 n.2. 
56. 7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1970), quoted at 397 U.S. at 162 n.3. 
57. Barlow v. Collins, 398 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1968). 
58. Barlow v. Minter, Civil No. 2494-N (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 1967). 
59. 398 F.2d at 401. 
60. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
61. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
62. 397 U.S. at 153: 397 U.S. at 164. 
63. 397 U.S. at 154. 
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against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism ... , 
unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."64 
It is not at all clear, however, how far the Court's opinions in 
Data Processing and Barlow go toward achieving the goal of opening 
up the courts to judicial review of administrative actions. In place 
of the old legal-wrong test, the Supreme Court has substituted a 
two-pronged test to be utilized in determining whether standing 
exists in any particular case. The first requirement is simply an 
acknowledgment of the article III limitation in the Constitution 
that restricts the judicial power of the federal courts to "cases" and 
"controversies."65 The Court stated that a plaintiff has satisfied this 
constitutional minimum when he alleges that "the challenged action 
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."66 The Court 
then added a second requirement to its test. It stated that a plaintiff, 
in order to establish his standing to bring the action, must assert 
interests which are "arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question."67 
B. The Meaning of the New Test 
In using such elastic words in its new test as "arguably" and 
"zone," the Court apparently intended to vest great discretion in the 
lower courts in their application of the test. The language employed 
by the Court is sufficiently broad that it might reasonably be inter-
preted as creating a presumption in favor of according the plaintiff 
standing. Such a presumption might apply if the plaintiff demon-
strates merely a minimal possibility that the legislation in question 
was intended to protect or regulate the interests that he is asserting. 
If the opinion of the Court in Data Processing is so broadly inter-
preted, the test laid down by the Court would serve to eliminate 
only purely frivolous suits. A sympathetic court would not often be 
forced to strain the law to find that a plaintiff has interests that 
"arguably" fall within some nebulous "zone" that Congress meant 
to regulate or protect. Unfortunately, this interpretation is somewhat 
a matter of speculation since the Court did not delineate 
carefully the nature of the inquiry required by the new test and 
left this most ambiguous standard open to a variety of conflicting 
interpretations. 68 
The first area of ambiguity concerns the precise formulation of 
64. 397 U.S. at 157. 
65. U.S. CoNsr. art. ill, § 2, discussed at 397 U.S. at 151. 
66. 397 U.S. at 152. The Court pointed out that standing "may stem from" injury 
to noneconomic interests such as aesthetics or conservation. 397 U.S. at 154. 
67. 397 U.S. at 153. 
68. The test has been criticized in Davis, supra note 38, at 458-68. 
552 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:540 
the second requirement of the new test. In Data Processing, the 
Court stated that the interests asserted must be arguably within the 
"zone of interests"69 protected or regulated by the statute. However, 
in applying this test, the Court noted that a competitor of the regu-
lated bank was within the "zone of interests,"70 and in the Barlow 
case it observed that the tenant farmers were within this zone.71 
Whether it is the "interests" or the "persons" that are the focus of 
examination is not merely an issue of semantics. An inquiry into 
whether a "person" is within the "zone of interests" indicates a 
different view of the nature of standing and its scope of application 
than does an inquiry into whether a particular "interest" is within 
that zone. On the one hand, if the plaintiff must be within the zone, 
then he must prove that he is an intended beneficiary of the statute. 
In effect, he must establish that Congress has impliedly conferred 
upon the limited class of which he is a member the right to protec-
tion against the type of harm that Congress intended to prohibit. He 
is asserting primarily a private right, and the public interest that 
Congress considered when it sought to regulate governmental or 
private encroachments on the plaintiff's statutory rights is only 
incidentally furthered. On the other hand, if the interest must be 
within the protected zone, then the relationship of the particular 
plaintiff to those interests is irrelevant and need not be examined. 
The plaintiff is asserting and furthering public interests in bringing 
his action. The personal injury he has suffered is only relevant in 
establishing the constitutional minimum of injury in fact.72 
A decision to follow the "persons" approach rather than the 
"interests" approach would dictate substantially different outcomes 
in many cases because the "persons" test is more restrictive than the 
"interests" test. If the former is used, the plaintiff must prove that 
Congress intended to protect him-i.e., his interests. This may often 
entail a ponderous review of legislative history in order to extract 
sometimes obscure and inscrutable statements of legislators' intent 
to protect the plaintiff. If the latter test is used, the plaintiff merely 
must prove that he is furthering the interests that Congress sought to 
protect, which may or may not have been his interests. This "inter-
est" test becomes, therefore, a mere pleading requirement since a 
brief inquiry into the statutory materials can reveal a general con-
gressional purpose to protect certain interests that the plaintiff can 
then incorporate into his pleadings. It does not have the effect of 
excluding persons who are not intended beneficiaries of congressional 
legislation. 
69. 397 U.S. at 153. 
70. 397 U.S. at 156. 
71. 397 U.S. at 164. 
72. See 397 U.S. at 152; 397 U.S. at 173 n.6 Gustice Brennan, concurring in the result 
and dissenting). 
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Perhaps the differences between these two extreme formulations 
of the Data Processing test may be illustrated best by a hypothetical 
situation based upon a variation of the fact situation in Barlow.73 
Assume that a merchant had been financially injured when farmers 
had cancelled orders for merchandise because of the assignment of 
benefit payments to their landlords. Under the "interests" approach, 
the merchant would probably qualify to assert the interests of the 
tenant farmers, which were generally protected by the relevant 
statute, in a challenge of the new regulation. However, under the 
"persons" approach that requires the plaintiff to be within the zone, 
the merchant would not have standing unless he could demonstrate 
that he, and not the farmer, was ·within the intended protection of 
Congress. Thus standing would be expanded or contracted depend-
ing on which formulation of the Data Processing the test is employed. 
Presumably, this confusion about what test the Court intended 
to set out in Data Processing results from inadvertent phraseology 
in the Court's opinion.74 However, a close reading of Data Processing 
and Barlow does not clearly reveal which is the more likely 
interpretation intended by the Court. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the Court intended to establish a test based upon 
reference to protected "interests." In support of this contention it is 
possible to argue that the "interest" formulation is first set out 
within the context of a general discussion of standing,75 and that 
this discussion establishes a general rule for administrative review. 
The statements by the Court that the competitors and the farmers 
were within the protected zone76 arguably can be dismissed as state-
ments peculiar to the facts of Data Processing and Barlow, since in 
those cases the persons whose interests were protected happened also 
to be the plaintiffs. In support of the "persons" interpretation, on 
the other hand, it must be noted that in both applications of the 
test, the Court examined only the interests of the plaintiffs. Such a 
limited examination may indicate a requirement that the plaintiff-
in order to be granted standing-must himself be an intended 
beneficiary of the applicable statute. In addition, the "persons" 
interpretation is more consistent with the Hardin test of implied 
review.77 In contrast, an "interest" test would be a major departure 
from prior law, and such a departure arguably would have been 
more clearly signalled by the Court. A definitive interpretation of 
the test must await future cases.78 
73. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra •. 
74. See text accompanying note 67 supra. 
75. 397 U.S. at 153-54. 
76. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra. 
77. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. 
78. Since the Supreme Court announced its decisions in Data Processing and Barlow, 
the lower courts have been afforded a few opportunities to utilize the new test. See 
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Perhaps a middle ground can be discerned from the opinions 
that may reconcile the two extreme interpretations of the Data 
Processing test. The Court may have meant that the interests of the 
plaintiff must be within the zone of interests protected or regulated 
by statute. This interpretation would obviate the logical difficulty 
in phrasing the test so that the "person" must be within the zone of 
interests. Although it is clear that "interests" may be within the zone 
of interests, it does not seem either grammatically or logically con-
ceivable that "persons" are "interests" protected by a statute. Thus, 
the language of the Court in Barlow to the effect that the "tenant 
farmers" were within the requisite zone may be interpreted to mean 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (five 
environmental organizations have standing to appeal refusal by Secretary of the 
Agriculture to ban chemical DDT under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-35k (1964)); Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (six individuals, including five mothers who 
presently or intend in the future to breast-feed their babies, and an environmental 
group, have standing under the FIFRA to seek review of denial by the Secretary of 
HEW of their petition to ban DDT); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 
425 F .2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (several local and national conservationist groups have stand-
ing to challenge the proposal for an expressway under three federal laws designed to 
protect the environment); Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970) (steel 
producer has standing to protest the order of the Foreign Trade Zone Board establishing 
a free-trade zone in Armco's market area; the court cited Data Processing, but also cited 
the Hardin "classes protected" test to support its holding of standing); Ballerina Pen 
Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. 
Aug. 14, 1970) (No. 545) (competitor of manufacturer of blind-made products has 
standing to challenge the actions of the Committee on Purchases of Blind-Made 
Products and the General Services Administration in including ball point pens in a 
special procurement procedure established by the Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 46-48 
(1964)); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (individuals in area and 
group on their behalf have standing under the APA to challenge proposed project to 
flare gas contained in cavity created by nuclear detonation). But see Sierra Club v. 
Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Nov. 
15, 1970) (No. 939) (Sierra Club cannot challenge Mineral King Valley project because 
the club has failed to show any injury in fact to itself or its members). Many of these 
cases have arisen in the area of environmental control. On the whole the courts in these 
cases have liberally defined the "zone of interests" protected by the environmental 
statutes. 
Thus far, the courts have required individual plaintiffs to demonstrate only a 
present or reasonably foreseeable harm to their health or safety. See Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083, 1085 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The burden of 
a plaintiff organization to demonstrate that it falls within a protected "zone of in-
terests" has been even milder. These organizations have been required to demonstrate 
only a continuing interest in the protection of the environment. See Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Significantly, one 
court has interpreted Data Processing to hold that § l0(a) of the APA (see note 24 
supra and accompanying text), rephrased as the "zone of interests" test, requires only 
injury in fact to confer standing. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 
1970) petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1970) (No. 939). 
That court's holding that the Sierra Club had not suffered the requisite injury in fact 
is questionable. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, the statute under which the 
suit was brought contained a "persons aggrieved" review provision. The court held 
that injury in fact was sufficient, but rather than citing Sanders, the court relied on 
Data Processing and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (428 F.2d at 1096 n.12), which 
may imply that the Data Processing test requires only injury in fact. 
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that the interests of tenant farmers were within that zone. 79 This 
third formulation would be, in effect, a modification of the Hardin 
test, and yet would not present either the logical difficulties inherent 
in a "person" formulation or the sharp break from earlier law that 
an "interest" formulation would entail. 
C. The Difficulties in Applying the New Test 
The effect that Data Processing and Barlow may have on the 
authority of the Court's decision in Hardin is not clear. In that case, 
it will be remembered, the Court said that in order for the plaintiff 
to be granted standing, a primary purpose of the statute must be to 
protect the class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member.80 In 
Data Processing, the Court mentioned the Hardin line of cases in 
discussing the evolution of standing theories,81 but did not expressly 
rely on that authority or apply the test used in Hardin.82 
Irrespective of whether the new test is formulated in terms of 
the "plaintiff's interests" or in terms of the "plaintiff himself," it 
appears that this test has modified the Hardin "class of persons" 
test so that the focus of any statutory inquiry will be shifted from 
the question of which particular parties are protected by statute to 
the broader question of which interests are protected. This change 
will likely permit an expanded inquiry into the policy objectives of 
a statute and, at the same time, relieve a court from determining 
which group of persons initiated or sponsored the legislation that 
was enacted into law. In a determination of the status of the actual 
plaintiff before the court, the phrase "plaintiff's interests are within 
the zone of interests" might be more conducive to this broadened 
analysis than the alternative formulation-"plaintiff is within the 
zone"-since the court could look to interests in appraising the status 
of the plaintiff rather than the intended role of beneficiary that he 
may play in the statutory scheme. This latter distinction seems 
largely theoretical and semantic; as a practical matter, rephrasing 
the test from "class of persons" to "zone of interests" protected will 
encourage the different legislative analysis described above. 
An examination of the facts in Data Processing reveals the 
differences between the "class of persons" and "zone of interests" 
tests. The relevant statute in that case only prohibited bank service 
corporations owned by banks from performing banking activities. 83 
79. !197 U.S. at 164. 
80. See text accompanying notes llll-!14 supra. 
81. !197 U.S. at 154-56. 
82. See text accompanying notes llll-!14 supra. 
8!1. See note 90 infra. 
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However, the plaintiffs were complaining of competition from banks, 
not bank service corporations. Under a Hardin analysis, a literal 
reading of the statute would render it inapplicable since the plain-
tiffs were not members of the class protected-competitors of bank 
service corporations. However, an analysis of the "zone of interests" 
protected would be more likely to produce the result actually reached 
by the Court-that Congress intended to protect the plaintiffs from 
bank-sponsored competition in general, not merely competition from 
bank service corporations. 
The new test enunciated in Data Processing may be useful to 
plaintiffs in a variety of factual contexts. First, if a statute protects 
against competition generally, without specifying the beneficiaries, 
it is more likely now that a court will infer that a particular competi-
tor-for example, a data-processing company-is within the zone of 
protection from competition for purposes of determining standing.8' 
Under the Hardin test, however, the court might have required the 
statutory language and history to refer specifically to the plaintiff-
competitor as the beneficiary of the legislation. 
Second, confusion may occasionally arise over what statute a 
court should look to in determining whether Congress established 
a protected "zone of interests." For example, while a plaintiff may 
have been iniured through an alieged violation of one specific stat-
ute, it may be that neither he nor his interests were the intended 
beneficiaries of that statute. It is possible, however, that, in another 
statute, Congress has indicated a desire to protect the very interest 
the olaintiff now asserts. Prior to Data Processing it would have been 
unlikely that a plaintiff in such a situation could have established 
standing. The requirement of the AP A that a plaintiff be aggrieved 
''within the meaning of a relevant statute"85 probably would have 
been interpreted as equating the "relevant statute" with the statute 
that was allegedly violated. Under Data Processing the wording of the 
AP A now appears to have been interpreted as synonymous with the 
"zone of interests" test, and this broader standard might well lead 
to a different result.86 A court might now be free to analyze both 
84. Sl'e. e.f!., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968). affd .. 
408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 315, affd. on remand, 428 
F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), revd. and remanded, 39 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970) (per 
curiam), in which the Supreme Court, interpreting its opinions in Data Processing and 
Barlow, overruled the lower courts' denial of standing: 
Here, as in Data Processing, we are concerned with § 4 of the Bank Services 
Corporation Act. In Data Processing we did not rely on any legislative history 
showing Conl?T("SS desired to protect data processors alone from competition, 
39 U.S.L.W. at 3226. 
Thus, the Court does not seem to require that the particular plaintiff be the exore~~ 
beneficiary of congressional protection. but only that he faU within a more general 
class of competitors who are within the zone of interests protected by statute. 
85. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964). 
86. Although the Supreme Court had not expressly considered the standing provi• 
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statutes that are arguably applicable in determining which general 
interests are protected. Although this precise issue does not appear 
to have been decided by the Court in Data Processing, it is quite 
likely to be raised in the future-especially in the area of environ-
mental control-by plaintiffs who would once have been deterred 
from entering into litigation by the rigid law of standing. 
Whatever formulation of the Data Processing test is finally 
adopted, the new test contains hazards similar to those that existed 
under the Hardin test. First, it should be noted that both extreme 
formulations of the Data Processing test necessarily require an 
inquiry, however brief, into the merits of the plaintiff's case.87 A 
plaintiff must undoubtedly prove that the administrative agency has 
misinterpreted or misapplied a statute in order to succeed on the 
merits. And the questions that must be answered in order to make this 
determination will be the same ones that are relevant to the "zone of 
interests" standing test: what activity was Congress attempting to 
encourage or preclude, what particular grievances moved Congress 
to action, which parties were especially in need of protection, and 
what countervailing considerations were considered by Congress in 
limiting the regulation to its expressed scope? The answers to these 
questions will often be culled from legislative history as well as from 
the statute on its face. It may be that the standards ultimately devised 
by the courts to determine legislative intent will be more onerous 
when the merits of the case are at stake than they will be when 
standing is the primary issue. Nevertheless, to the extent that both 
formulations of the "zone of interests" test require an inquiry into 
sion of § IO(a) of the APA (see note 24 supra and accompanying text) prior to Data 
Processing, the lower courts had consistently interpreted that provision as being merely 
a codification of the legal-wrong test of the Tennessee Power case. See notes 23-29 supra 
and accompanying text. In view of the Court's express disavowal of the legal-wrong test 
in Data Processing (see text accompanying note 62 supra), this position is no longer 
tenable. The Court did not state explicitly that it was interpreting the APA. Never-
theless, while the language of the Court is not without some ambiguity, the Court 
apparently has taken the opportunity in Data Processing to interpret § IO(a) for the 
first time. The Court seems to have equated the language of § lO(a) entitling a person 
who has been "aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" to judicial review 
with the test formulated in Data Processing that a plaintiff need only be "arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute •••• " 397 U.S. 
at 153. The Court stated: 
The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of standing is 
different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the question 
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing 
to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 
397 U.S. at 153-54. 
87. & the interest required to be brought within the "zone" becomes more 
specific, standing will become more restrictive and the test may begin to resemble the 
legal•wrong test in theory and effect. 
558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:540 
the merits, the tests are inconsistent with a theory of standing that 
requires only the minimum of "personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy."88 
Second, an examination of legislative history often presents 
serious difficulties. Legislative history frequently gives little indica-
tion of who was intended to be the beneficiary of legislation or of 
the scope of protection beyond the express language of the statute. 
The testimony of witnesses, the reports of committees, and the 
debates among congressmen may generate a wide variety of reasons, 
sometimes contradictory, for the passage of the legislation under 
consideration.89 Al; an analytical tool, such an inquiry may encourage 
courts to adopt a result-oriented approach-courts would conclude 
that standing should or should not be conferred on unexpressed 
policy grounds, but would support their decisions by a broad or 
narrow reading of the legislative history. The decisions of the courts 
of appeals in two factually related cases demonstrate the perils 
inherent in an analysis of legislative history. In Data Processing, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the application of 
the legislative history of the Bank Service Corporation Act (BSCA),90 
which prohibited bank service corporations from performing non-
banking services for anyone other than banks, because in the factual 
context of Data Processing, a bank, not a service corporation, was 
performing the services.91 However, in Wingate Corporation v. 
Industrial National Bank,92 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
applied the legislative history of the BSCA to the same factual set-
ting93 and found that Congress had intended to protect competitors 
from both bank service corporations and banks.94 Although, as a 
88. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). 
89. See Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 957, 
968 (1940). 
90. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1964). Section 1864 of the Act provides: "No bank service 
corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services 
for banks." 
91. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 843 
n.12 (8th Cir. 1969). 
92. 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 987 (1970). The First Circuit 
consolidated Wingate with Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, which was vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court. 397 U.S. 315 (1970) (per curiam). See note 84 supra. 
93. In Wingate, as in Data Processing, the plaintiff was a computer service corpora-
tion and the defendant was a bank competing with the plaintiff. 
94. 408 F .2d at 1152-53. The legislative history cited by the court in Wingate revealed 
that the primary purpose of the Act was the protection of the solvency of banks. The 
committee reports revealed no intent to protect any industry from the competition of 
banks. 
The difficulties in deciphering legislative intent were reflected in another case 
involving the Comptroller's rulings. In Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins. 
Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968), the court found that the plaintiff insurance agents 
had standing to review a Comptroller's ruling that banks could act as insurance agencies 
incident to banking transactions, although such activities were statutorily limited to 
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result of the decision in Data Processing, only an "arguable" degree 
of statutory protection must be shown,95 courts might still differ 
over the proper interpretation to be given statutory language and 
history, and thus might also differ in resolving the question whether 
the requisite statutory protection has been demonstrated. 
The Court's application of the new test to the facts in Data 
Processing and Barlow highlights the perplexities of statutory analy-
sis and the continuing uncertainty over the proper formulation of 
the new test. In Data Processing the Supreme Court relied on the 
Wingate decision to support its holding that a competitor is within 
the zone of interests protected by the banking statutes.96 But the 
portion of the Wingate decision quoted by the Court does not 
support this proposition because it only reveals that the BSCA was 
designed to protect the financial stability of banks, not to protect 
competitors. In another portion of the opinion in Wingate the First 
Circuit cited the fact that the banking legislation was a response to 
the concerns of the National Association of Public Accountants, 
which sought protection for its members from bank competition.97 
Yet this latter portion of the Wingate decision is not cited by the 
Court in Data Processing. If one assumes the proper formulation 
of the new test to be that "persons" must be "within the zone of 
interests," the Court in Data Processing clearly did not support a 
finding of standing under its own test since it did not satisfactorily 
demonstrate that Congress intended to protect competitors. 
places that had populations not exceeding 5000. Unsuccessful attempts to repeal the 
provision were cited by the court to demonstrate a congressional intent to protect in• 
surance agents from bank competition, but no such intent was found in the original 
passage of the Act. !199 F.2d at 1018. 
95. See text accompanying note 67 supra. 
96. The Court stated: 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in [Wingate] that by reason of § 4 
a data processing company has standing to contest the legality of a national bank 
performing data processing services for other banks and bank customers: 
"Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the service corporations. 
It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such 
a prohibition, the bill would have enabled 'banks to engage in a nonbanking 
activity,' S. Rep. No. 2105, (87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-121 (Supplemental views of 
Senators Proxmire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and tlius constitute 'a serious 
exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.' 
(Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark). We think Congress has 
provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the competition 
may not be the precise kind Congress legislated against.'' 
397 U.S. at 155. 
97. 408 F.2d at 1152-53. The Court could have also cited a statement by Senator 
Proxmire, a sponsor of the bill that became the Bank Service Corporation Act, that 
banks would have cost and market advantages over their nonbank competitors and 
that 
[a] number of these businesses have informed me and other Senators that this kind 
of competition would be very unfair. It would be unfair because the bank could 
use their own personnel charge, merely the out-of-pocket cost, and the unfair 
competition could drive businesses now offering this kind of service to the wall. 
108 CONG. REc. 22,031 (1962). 
560 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:540 
However, this lack of support may imply that the Court looked 
only to whether the interests sought to be protected by the complain-
ant-for example, the financial stability of banks-were the public 
interests of bank solvency rather than the personal interests of 
protecting the plaintiff. Such an interpretation of the Court's analy-
sis would lend support to the formulation of the test that only 
general interests, not persons, must fall within the "zone of interests" 
protected or regulated by Congress. 
Moreover, if the interests of the particular plaintiff must be 
asserted, then Barlow does not aid greatly in the determination of 
the type or particularity of interest that must be shown. In Barlow, 
the Court cursorily cited98 a general provision in the Food and Agri-
culture Act which stated that "the Secretary [ of Agriculture] shall 
provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants .... "00 
However, the Court could not point to any specific statutory lan-
guage or legislative history that tended to show that Congress 
recognized the particular interest of tenant farmers in the assignment 
of benefits and that it intended to protect that interest. The prob-
lems inherent in any statutory analysis are, therefore, heightened by 
the ambiguity of the new test. If the plaintiff is only required to 
assert a general protection, then there is little substance left to the 
test; if he is required to assert particular protection, then the court 
is likely to have considerable difficulty in applying the test since 
Congress often does not indicate its reasons for enacting specific 
statutory provisions. 
IV. THE BRENNAN-WHITE POSITION-AN .ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
As an alternative to the approach taken by the majority in Data 
Processing, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Barlow 
joined by Justice White,100 offered his own views on how best to 
resolve the question of standing to challenge the rulings of an admin-
istrative agency. Unlike the majority, Justice Brennan sharply dis-
tinguished the concept of standing from the concept of reviewability. 
Justice Brennan noted that under the "zone of interests" test 
adopted by the majority in Data Processing, a plaintiff is required 
to prove that Congress has granted him a right of review in the 
action brought by him.101 However, Justice Brennan contended that 
such a requirement is inappropriate in resolving issues of standing. 
According to Justice Brennan, an inquiry into standing should focus 
solely on whether the party who institutes the action has a personal 
98. 397 U.S. at 164. 
99. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(10) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
100. 397 U.S. at 167 austice Brennan, concurring in the :result and dissenting). This 
opinion applied to Barlow and to Data Processing. 
101. 397 U.S. at 168. 
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adversary stake in the outcome of the litigation.102 Yet an inquiry into 
the interests or class of persons protected by the relevant statutes de-
mands an analysis of the merits of the case and is therefore alien to 
the question of standing. Thus, the determination whether or not 
Congress intended to give the plaintiff a right of judicial review is a 
question to be decided in the separate area of law dealing with 
reviewability. Justice Brennan noted that reviewability itself is 
composed of two issues: whether anyone can challenge agency action, 
and whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to judicial review.103 
In order to establish reviewability of the substantive issues presented, 
an examination of "[p ]ertinent statutory language, legislative history, 
and public policy considerations"104 is required to help determine 
whether the "slight indicia that the plantiff's class is a beneficiary"105 
of a statute supports the inference that Congress intended that 
review be available to the plaintiff. 
Justice Brennan's view that any inquiry into the "zone of inter-
ests protected" actually presents questions of reviewability rather 
than standing is more than theoretically significant. Acceptance of 
this view by the courts would not simply mean that under the Bren-
nan test courts would dismiss actions on reviewability grounds be-
cause the plaintiff is not within a protected class, whereas under the 
majority's test the same courts would dismiss actions on standing 
grounds. Clearly different results might arise. First, the Supreme Court 
has broadly interpreted the reviewability provision of the AP A, and 
has held that it is a "seminal" Act under which "judicial review of a 
final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless 
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of 
Congress."106 Therefore, a strong inference-indeed, almost a pre-
sumption-arises that a plaintiff's case is reviewable. As noted 
above,107 it is possible that the "zone of interests" test promulgated by 
the majority in Data Processing will be broadly interpreted similarly 
to require a presumption in favor of standing. It is clear, however, 
that the majority was not willing explicitly to require such a pre-
sumption. 
Moreover, it may be inferred from the flexibility of the wording 
used by Justice Brennan to express his test for reviewability that he 
would want to maintain the traditional presumption favoring the 
plaintiff.108 Justice Brennan-in language that is much more explicit 
102. ll97 U.S. at 172. 
l0ll. ll97 U.S. at 169 n.2. 
104. ll97 U.S. at 17ll. 
105. ll97 U.S. at 175. 
106. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, ll87 U.S. lll6, 140 (1967), interpreting§ 10 of the APA, 
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
107. See text following note 67 supra. 
108. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION !136-53 (1965). 
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than that used by the majority-noted that public policy may be 
more often furthered by conferring standing than by denying it.10° 
Therefore, Justice Brennan would generally require only "slight 
indicia that the plaintiff's class is a beneficiary."110 This presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiff's right to challenge agency action 
becomes even stronger when the "plaintiff is the only party likely to 
challenge the action. Refusal to allow him review would, in effect, 
commit the action wholly to agency discretion, thus risking frustra-
tion of the statutory objectives."111 Justice Brennan's approach would 
obviate the continuing problem, demonstrated in a number of areas, 
that the only parties that are likely to challenge important admin-
istrative determinations have not previously met the standing test.112 
The majority's test, however, does not meet these problems, although 
its wording is sufficiently broad that courts might consider similar 
public-interest factors under the guise of analyzing the interests 
protected. 
In contrast to the approach taken by Justice Brennan in his 
concurring opinion, the majority classified section lO(a) of the APA 
as a hybrid standing-reviewability provision.113 By not employing 
section IO(a) for standing purposes, Justice Brennan's analysis is 
theoretically more sound than that of the majority in its exclusion 
of any inquiry into the merits in the determination of standing.114 
However, whether a challenge to the actions of an administrative 
agency will be heard or not should depend on more than the conclu-
sory labelling of a section of the AP A as either one relating both to 
standing and reviewability or solely to review·ability. Rather, any 
difference in result should be founded on an interpretation of the 
entire AP A as a coherent whole and on relevant policy considera-
tions. Although the legislative history of the AP A would probably be 
of minimal assistance in distinguishing "standing" from "reviewabil-
ity"-two extremely technical concepts-the AP A's general purposes 
and remedial character could be beneficial in finally developing a 
coherent and consistent interpretation of section IO of the Act.11r; 
In addition, the Court could balance the exigencies of liberalized 
review and the presumption in favor of reviewability under the AP A 
109. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9. 
110. 397 U.S. at 175. 
111. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9. 
112. See the discussions in notes 2, 14, 8e 16 supra and accompanying text. 
113. The majority in Data Processing used APA § IO(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 
1965-1969) both as a test for standing (397 U.S. at 153) and as a test for reviewability 
(397 U.S. at 157). 
114. 397 U.S. at 172-73. 
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). See 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). The Court there cited the legisla-
tive history of the APA and its own cases interpreting it as evidencing "the basic pre-
sumption of judicial review" covering a "broad spectrum of administrative actions." 
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against traditional notions of judicial self-restraint. Standing and 
reviewability should be interpreted consistently with each other. A 
standing test that is more restrictive than a reviewability test would 
undermine the latter if its effect were to make it too difficult for 
many potential plaintiffs to obtain effective review of agency action. 
However, an evaluation of these considerations is not undertaken by 
either opinion in Data Processing. Consequently, important practical 
differences depend instead on semantic and theoretical classifications. 
The majority and Brennan opinions in Data Processing also 
differ on the applicability in agency review cases of the doctrines 
expressed in Flast v. Cohen.116 In Flast, the Court held that federal 
taxpayers, claiming a violation of their first amendment rights, had 
standing to challenge government financial aid to religious schools. 
In order to obtain standing in that case, the plaintiff taxpayer was 
required to show only that he had suffered sufficient personal injury 
to ensure that the litigation would be a truly adversary one.117 The 
majority in Data Processing stated that the standing requirement in 
Flast did not "necessarily track"118 the standing requirement in 
suits to review agency action, although "the two have the same 
Article III starting point."119 The majority, therefore, did not apply 
merely the constitutional minimum of injury in fact to the cases 
before it. However, Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, 
argued that the same standard utilized in Flast should be applied 
in Data Processing and Barlow.120 
The possible applicability of Flast to cases concerning review of 
agency action raises more complex considerations than the majority 
and concurring opinions in Data Processing suggest. Although Justice 
Brennan seemed to ignore the point in his opinion in Barlow, the 
Court actually went beyond the simple injury-in-fact test in its 
decision in Flast. The Court in Flast required the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional 
limitations upon the congressional taxing and spending power.121 In 
a sense this test is analogous to the "zone of interests" test in that it 
requires an implicit constitutional grant of standing in much the 
same way that Data Processing requires an implicit legislative grant 
of standing. The Data Processing test adopted by the majority might, 
therefore, be more properly viewed as a modification of the Flast 
test designed specifically for agency review cases. 
In the final analysis, whether the simple constitutional minimum 
116. 392 U.S. 88 (1968). 
117. 392 U.S. at 99-100. 
118. 397 U.S. at 152. 
119. 397 U.S. at 152. 
120. 897 U.S. at 172-7!1. 
121. !192 U.S. at 102-04. 
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or the more rigorous gloss that the Flast opinion imposed on the 
availability of standing should be applied to agency actions is depen-
dent on an evaluation of the judiciary's special role in our system 
and its relationship with the other branches of government. Many 
of the factors that are relevant in determining whether standing 
should be liberalized are relevant to an analysis of this broader 
policy issue as well.122 Unfortunately, the Court in Data Processing 
did not conduct such a policy assessment; rather, it simply stated its 
refusal to apply the constitutional minimum as its sole guide.123 
V. A PRACTICAL .APPLICATION OF THE NEW TEST 
The degree of confusion that exists in the area of standing was 
reflected in National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) v. 
SEC,124 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit a few months prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Data 
Processing and Barlow. In that case, groups representing mutual 
funds and mutual-fund salesmen sought review of an order of the 
Comptroller of the Currency allowing nationally chartered banks to 
operate collective investment funds. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
ruling was inconsistent with and violated sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of 
the Glass-Steagall Act.125 It was generally agreed that for purposes of 
the AP A the Glass-Steagall Act was the "relevant statute" under which 
the action was brought. It was also clear that the Glass-Steagall Act, un-
like the statute involved in the Sanders case,126 did not expressly grant 
judicial review to all aggrieved parties. An examination of the rele-
vant legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act revealed that the Act 
was "not intended by Congress to protect mutual funds from compe-
tition from banks."127 Rather, the Act was designed to promote the 
solvency of banks by ensuring a separation of commercial banking 
activity from dealing in securities.128 
122. See pt. II supra. 
123. 397 U.S. at 152-53. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
124. 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. granted, !!97 U.S. 986 (1970) 
(No. 835, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term). See Comment, NA.SD v. SEC-
Standing To Sue, Economic Power, Banks and Mutual Funds, 55 VA. L. R.Ev. 1493 (1969); 
Case Comment, 50 B.U. L. R.Ev. 417 (1970). 
125. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 (1964). Section 16 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 
(seventh) (1964), provides in part: 
• • • The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national banking] 
association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock 
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in 
no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of 
securities or stock •••• 
126. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra. 
127. 420 F.2d at 96 Gudge Bazelon, concurring). 
128. 420 F.2d at 99-100 Oudge Bazelon, concurring). The fact that the separation of 
commercial banking and underwriting was the primary objective of the Glass-Steagall 
Act was brought out in an earlier case dealing with the Act. In Baker, Watts &: Co. v. 
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The court of appeals confessed genuine uncertainty concerning 
how the standing issue might properly be resolved. In separate 
opinions, Judges Bazelon129 and Burger130 recognized that although 
the plaintiffs had suffered injury in fact as a result of the Comp-
troller's ruling, they did not seem to meet the requirements of any of 
the established tests in order to be accorded standing. Both judges 
concluded, however, that the plaintiffs were entitled to standing, and 
seemed to base these conclusions on the belief that public policy 
required prompt resolution of the issues raised by the plaintiffs on 
the merits and no more appropriate plaintiffs seemed likely to appear 
soon.131 
A brief survey of the pre-Data Processing law relating to standing 
clearly indicates the dilemma that the court faced in NASD. The 
plaintiffs could not show any direct harm arising from the violation 
of a contract, tort, or property right since the legal-wrong test first 
promulgated in the Tennessee Power case clearly held that competi-
tors had no right to be free from government-encouraged competi-
tion.132 Similarly, section IO(a) of the APA generally had been 
interpreted as codifying the legal-wrong test,133 and thus plaintiffs 
could not rely upon that provision to grant them standing. Even the 
liberalized test for standing laid down by the Supreme Court in its 
decision in Hardin required that the "primary purpose" of the 
statute must be to protect the "class of persons" of which the plaintiff 
is a member.134 As noted above,135 an analysis of the legislative intent 
Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. sub nom. Port of N.Y. Authority v. 
Baker, Watts&: Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968), discussed in note 16 supra, the district 
court discussed the background of banking failures that precipitated the passage of the 
Act. The court of appeals also discussed the legislative history of the Act in its exami-
nation of the merits of the Baker case. 392 F.2d at 498-502. 
129. 420 F.2d at 96, 100. 
130. 420 F.2d at 107-08. 
131. Judge Bazelon stated, in holding that the Investment Company Institute, one 
of the plaintiffs in NASD, had standing: 
It is the only party likely to assert the public interest in observance of the banking 
laws by the agency responsible for enforcing them. In the exceptional circumstances 
of this case, I would grant the ICI standing to vindicate the public interest despite 
the absence of a statutory aid to standing. 
420 F.2d at 100. Judge Burger wrote: 
... I am unable to set aside my grave doubts as to Appellees' standing to institute 
and maintain these suits. However, in the uncertain state of the law as to standing, 
there is something to be said on both sides of that question. I therefore resolve 
my doubts in favor of the Appellees . • • • I am influenced substantially, as I 
indicated at the outset, by the need for judicial examination of the important 
questions raised. 
420 F.2d at 108. 
132. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text. 
133. See note 27 supra. 
134. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text. 
135. See text accompanying note 127 supra. 
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clearly precluded a holding that mutual funds were intended to be 
the primary beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Despite this vast amount of prior law and legislative history, 
however, Judge Bazelon found the public-policy arguments for 
granting standing persuasive: 
It is fortuitous that there is no aid to standing for these plaintiffs. 
I£ underwriters, insurance agents, data processors, and securities 
dealers are right that banks are prohibited by law from entering 
their businesses, Congress would never have foreseen that administra-
tive rulings under the banking laws would substantially affect their 
economic interests.136 
It is submitted that NASD is precisely the type of case that the 
Supreme Court attempted to anticipate in its decisions in Data 
Processing and Barlow. Accordingly, in an attempt to put in some 
sort of logical perspective the various theoretical dichotomies already 
discussed in this Comment, the possible formulations of the new 
test relating to the law of standing will be applied to the factual 
setting in NASD. 
It will be recalled that under the first possible formulation of 
the Data Processing "zone of interests" test, the plaintiff himself 
must fall "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute .... "137 The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall 
Act does not indicate any congressional intent to protect mutual funds. 
However, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933138-long before the 
mutual-fund industry became a major factor in the investment 
market.139 Therefore, it is arguable that the legislative history of the 
statute may not even be relevant or appropriate to a resolution of 
the standing issue in 1970. It would seem somehow absurd to deter-
mine the issue of standing upon the results of such an inquiry, but 
this first formulation of the Data Processing test appears to require 
an examination of legislative history. Unless some mention of protec-
tion for competitors in general could be discovered in the statutory 
materials, under this formulation of the test the plaintiffs in NASD 
would probably not have standing-even with the aid afforded by 
the use of such flexible words as "arguably" and "zone." 
I£ the Data Processing test were interpreted to require only that 
a plaintiff's interests need be within the zone,140 the plaintiffs in 
136. 420 F.2d at 99. 
137. 397 U.S. at 153. See text following note 71 supra. 
138. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. 
139. See I. FRIEND, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS app. tables 
1-2, at 114 (1970), based on the Securities and Exchange Commission Statistical Bulletin 
of May 1969: 
Market Value of Stockholdings of Selected Classes of Investors (Billions of Dollars): 
Total Stock 
Mutual Funds Outstanding 
1940 $ 0.4 $ 77.'!, 
1968 50.9 761.'!, 
140. See text following note 78 supra. 
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N ASD would have a greater likelihood of establishing standing. Al-
though the narrow competitive interests of the plaintiffs probably 
are not protected, the plaintiffs could assert that the interests pro-
tected by the statute are the safety, security, and stability of financial 
markets and institutions in general. As financial institutions, mutual 
funds operate in the financial markets and are simultaneously con-
tributors to the safety of those markets and dependent on the safety 
and solvency of other institutions, including banks. Thus, it is 
possible that mutual funds are implied beneficiaries of the interests 
of safety and solvency that are furthered by the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Such an analysis might at least fit the mutual funds "arguably" 
within the requisite "zone," although some courts might find the 
relationship between the plaintiffs' interests and those of the statute 
somewhat tenuous. If the opinion in Data Processing is read to 
instruct courts to err on the side of granting standing when an 
"arguable" claim is asserted, the plaintiffs would be more likely to 
have standing under this analysis and formulation of the test. 
If the Data Processing test were interpreted to mean that the 
interests asserted by the plaintiffs must be within those protected 
by statute, but do not have to be those personal to the plaintiffs,141 
a more straightforward analysis would be possible. The interests 
furthered by the Glass-Steagall Act can most accurately be character-
ized as "public" interests: the protection of the solvency of banks by 
prohibiting risky investments and underwriting arrangements, and 
ultimately and primarily, the protection of the public from the 
economic disasters and depressions that are caused or aggravated by 
bank failures. The mutual funds could assert that they are essentially 
furthering that public interest by challenging the illegality of the 
Comptroller's action. Such an interpretation of the Data Processing 
test would recognize that regulatory legislation usually is intended 
to protect public interests rather than private interests, and 
that the considerations of public interests are more appropri-
ately examined when determining the standing of the plaintiff. It is 
true that special legislation sometimes carves out protection for 
special interest groups, but the legislative history of such statutes 
usually indicates clearly that the protection of the special interests 
is the primary purpose of the legislation. When public interests are 
the primary concern of Congress, however, the two previous formula-
tions of the Data Processing test would dictate either a strained 
attempt to find that the plaintiffs are intended beneficiaries of the 
statute or a finding of no standing, which may effectively block 
judicial review of important legal controversies. 
Under the approach advocated by Justices Brennan and White,142 
a court would decide the issue of standing solely by determining 
141. See text preceding note 72 supra. 
142. See pt. IV supra, 
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whether or not the plaintiff had suffered injury in fact. There 
appears little doubt that such injury could be proven by the plain-
tiffs in NASD. Under the Brennan approach, the court, having thus 
held that the plaintiffs had standing, would then determine whether 
or not the issue they raised was reviewable. Justice Brennan argued 
that in order to establish reviewability, a plaintiff need demonstrate 
only some "slight indicia" that he is a member of the class pro-
tected.143 As the foregoing analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act irtdi-
cates, it is possible that mutual-fund representatives may not be able 
to meet even this minimal requirement for reviewability. Justice 
Brennan explicitly foresaw that in some circumstances the plaintiff 
might not fit within his "class protected" test. In those instances, 
he would take into account "public policy considerations"144 to 
determine reviewability. He noted that especially when the plaintiff 
is the only party likely to challenge the administrative action, a court 
should be very generous in defining the scope of congressional pro-
tection in order to avoid frustration of statutory objectives.145 Judges 
Bazelon and Burger clearly indicated their belief that the plaintiffs 
in N ASD were members of the limited class likely to challenge the 
action of the Comptroller.146 Accordingly, the strong presumption in 
favor of reviewability accorded by Justice Brennan's approach and by 
the AP A would no doubt be sufficient to provide for a grant of stand-
ing to the plaintiffs in that case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It must be conceded that any analysis of the various formulations 
of the new standing test found in Data Processing and Barlow is 
highly speculative. An analysis such as that attempted in this 
Comment must, of necessity, draw upon possible implications and 
alternative interpretations that the Supreme Court quite possibly 
did not intend to suggest. An opportunity now exists for the Court 
to clarify the confusion produced by its somewhat inconsistent choice 
of phraseology in Data Processing and Barlow. The Supreme Court 
has agreed to review the opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in NASD.147 The opinion that 
emerges from that case may go far toward clearly setting forth the 
means with which the federal judiciary may fulfill its newfound 
mandate to provide an effective forum for reviewing the activities 
of the federal regulatory agencies. 
143. 397 U.S. at 175. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
144. 397 U.S. at 173. 
145. 397 U.S. at 175 n.9. See text accompanying note 111 supra. 
146. 420 F.2d at 100, 107-08. 
147. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. 397 U.S. 986 (1970) (No. 835, 
1969 Term; renumbered No. 59, 1970 Term). 
